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abstract
The research problem addressed in this paper is the issue of the process of the 
accession of the Republic of Lithuania to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940 and the 
political context of this event. There is much historical and political controversy nowadays 
around the history of Kremlin politics in 1939–1941, but recently the subject of annexation 
of Lithuania has not been discussed, and the issue of relations and diplomatic relations 
between the two countries has not been described in detail in Polish historiography so far. 
The research question was formulated as follows: why, in spite of the October 1939 Mutual 
Assistance Treaty, did Moscow decide to change the status quo and directly annex the 
neighbouring country, disregarding the considerable number of alternative scenarios 
and extensive possibilities of controlling Lithuania’s policy? The research was conducted 
by analysing the documents of the diplomatic services of both countries (among which 
diplomatic correspondence occupies a special place), the then Soviet press from the point 
of view of the propaganda message used, as well as using memoiristic sources. As a result 
of the conducted research, no definite reasons for initiating the process of annexation 
of Lithuania by the USSR were defined, but a number of factors that may have a significant 
impact on the Kremlin’s move were revealed. These include the successes of the Third 
Reich in the Second World War at that time, which, according to Moscow, could threaten 
the position of the USSR in the Baltic States and the achievements made, as well as the 
Kremlin’s far-reaching imperial plans and the search for borders in the region.
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Incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union1 in 1940 – the act of 
‘liberation’ from Antanas Smetona’s regime and the will of joining the 
great Union of the Soviet States expressed in elections by the freed nation – 
constitutes an example of bloodless annexation of a neighbouring country 
through both diplomatic blackmail and mechanisms imitating peaceful 
democratic procedures and imitating support of the population. The event 
was also a part of a larger intrigue of Soviet diplomacy in order to quickly 
incorporate independent Baltic republics: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. 
Annexations of these countries are poorly grounded in Polish collective 
awareness, usually perceived as just one of the episodes of World War II. 
In reality, such annexation was a several-months-long political process 
without a pre-established course, which depended on the political situation 
in Europe in any given moment. They also constitute a case study describing 
the dogmas of USSR’s foreign policy in the time of Stalinism. 
Starting from the provisions of Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and signing 
by Lithuanian authorities of a Mutual Assistance Treaty with USSR on 
10 October 1939 began the process of gradually increasing dependence of 
Kaunas from its eastern neighbour. Under that treaty, then-Polish Vilnius, 
constitutional capital city of Lithuania2, was taken in September 1939 by 
the Red Army and granted to Lithuanians by the Kremlin in exchange 
for allowing the Soviet troops to remain stationed within borders of 
the Lithuanian country. For the following ten months, Lithuania, at 
the price of restrictions in foreign policy resulting from the agreement 
with Moscow, tried to remain independent in spite of the war raging in 
Europe. Paradoxically, it was a time of peace and relatively independent 
internal policies. The period ended on 25 May 1940 when the Lithuanian 
government received a letter from Kremlin with accusations regarding 
serious infringements of the provisions of the treaty, including kidnappings 
of Red Army soldiers from garrisons stationed in Lithuania. Shortly 
afterwards, in the night of 14 to 15 June during a meeting in Kremlin, 
the People’s Commissar (narkom)3 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
1  The preferred Polish form of ‘Soviet Union’ used in the study is ‘Związek Radziecki’ 
rather than ‘Sowiecki’. Both forms are equally prevalent in modern Polish literature, often 
used as synonyms, sometimes for signalling personal opinions and viewpoint of an author 
towards a given topic whereas it is regarded that the latter expression suggests a negative 
attitude of a writer to USSR. Therefore to avoid the impression of political bias and to 
maintain objectivity of the study it was decided that the adjective ‘radziecki’, a direct 
translation of the word ‘советский’, will be used as a proper form.
2  The actual capital city of Lithuania, due to ‘Polish occupation’ of Vilnius was 
Kaunas, treated as a ‘temporary capital city’. 
3  The People’s Commissar (rus. народный комиссар), so called narkom (rus. нарком) 
– a function corresponding to the role of a minister in the USSR. 
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the USSR, Vyacheslav Molotov, gave an ultimatum to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Juozas Urbšys, requesting a change of the government to 
a pro-Soviet one and allowing the Red Army free entry into the country. 
Supported by the accusations regarding the breach of the provisions of 
the Mutual Assistance Treaty the ultimatum was accepted. The country 
stripped of its independence was incorporated into the Soviet Union 
already in August 1940. 
The research question addressed in this article is: why did Kremlin 
decide to change the status quo and directly annex Lithuania in spite of the 
treaty of October 1939 and extensive capabilities of controlling its policies 
due to having multiple military bases in that country, which effectively 
intimidated and paralysed the Lithuanian authorities? It leads to a follow-
up question: did the events of the early period of World War II directly 
affect the decision of USSR to incorporate Lithuania? Finally: how was the 
annexation conducted, what were the political and legal stages and how 
were they disguised as democratic choice?
Current findings allow us to set forth a thesis that the decision of 
incorporating Lithuania was taken mostly due to the fall of France 
which could threaten USSR’s influence in the region of the Baltic States. 
Furthermore, the annexation of Lithuania allowed greater support of 
the western flank of the Soviet Union, the border with Germany along 
the Neman River and – in broader context – restitution of authority 
over territories lost in World War I. This falls within the general policy 
of USSR in Central and Eastern Europe implemented in years 1939-1940, 
oriented on extending the influence of Kremlin on the entire region, as 
well as execute interim geopolitical goals: extensive access to the sea and 
control over the borders of the Third Reich in face of the war. This is in 
conflict with the version of events promoted in Soviet historiography, 
which mentions securing western borders of USSR as a primary goal of 
Joseph Stalin’s efforts, implementation of the demands of the working and 
peasant classes of the Baltic republics and changes in the political system 
via a bottom-up peaceful revolution4.
Foreign policy of USSR regarding Lithuania, Baltic states and the 
general area of Central-Eastern Europe in late 1930s and early 40s is a topic 
already covered in Polish and foreign literature, especially in the 1980s and 
90s when documents of Soviet diplomacy were gradually being revealed, 
4  Example reference in this context: Historia dyplomacji 1939–1945, vol. 4, eds. A.A. 
Gromyko et al., Warszawa 1982, p. 143; И.К. Кузьмичев, Борьба Советского Союза за мир 
и безопасность против распространения фашистской агрессии (апрель 1940 – июнь 1941г.), 
‘История СССР’ 1974, 1, p. 29; С.Ю. Норейкене, Советско–литовске культурные связы 
1920–1940 годов, ‘Вопросы истории’ 1976, 12, p. 130.
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disclosed and studied. The basis of this study is made of the analysis 
of the published documents of diplomatic services of both countries – 
bilateral and internal, as well as the agreements concluded between them. 
The research also encompassed Soviet daily press in order to examine the 
propaganda aspect of the annexation of Lithuania (newspapers ‘Pravda’ 
and ‘Izvestia’), which the Kremlin intended to spread among the public 
and abroad, as well as memoirist materials.
The publication should be treated as a study of the inefficiently 
conducted neutrality politics in face of imperial politics and annexation 
of the smaller country as a result. In context of today’s politics in former 
USSR territories, Lithuania’s annexation seems similar to the annexation 
of Crimea by Russia in 2014, which gives it a timeless meaning.
DiPLoMatic coercion
As a result of the agreement of the Third Reich and USSR defined in the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (23 August 1939)5 and German–Soviet Frontier 
Treaty (28 September 1939), under which Central-Eastern Europe was 
divided into areas of influence, with Lithuania and other Baltic states on 
the Soviet side6. The The Second Republic of Poland was divided into 
the two powers, whereas Vilnius, during interwar period constituting 
a disputed issue between Kaunas and Warsaw, became a part of Soviet 
territory after the invasion of Poland by the Red Army. On 10 October 1939, 
a Treaty on the handover of Vilnius and Vilnius County and mutual assistance 
between the USSR and Lithuania was signed on the initiative of the Soviets. 
Under the treaty, the parties agreed to mutual military assistance in the 
event of invasion of Lithuania or the USSR through Lithuanian territory. 
It also obliged the parties to not sign treaties against each other with 
third countries. Furthermore, 20,000 Red Army soldiers were relocated 
to Lithuanian territory. Lithuania received territorial spoils in form of 
Vilnius and a part of its former Vilnius Voivodeship7. Similar treaties 
5  Договор о ненападении между Германией и Советским Союзом, in: Документы 
внешней политики, 1939 год, vol. XXII, книга I, Москва 1992, p. 631 [hereinafter: ДВП 1939, 
кн. I]; Секретный дополнительный протокол, in: ДВП 1939, кн. I, p. 632.
6  Германо–Советский договор о дружбе и границе между СССР и Германией, in: 
Документы внешней политики, 1939 год, книга II, Москва 1992, p. 134 [hereinafter: ДВП 
1939, кн. II]; Доверительный протокол, in: ДВП 1939, кн. II, p. 135.
7  Договор о передаче Литовской Республике города Вильно и Виленской области 
и о взаимопомощи между Советским Союзом и Литвой, in: ДВП 1939, кн. II, p. 175; 
Конфиденциальный протокол, in: ДВП 1939, кн. II, p. 175. 
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(without handing over any territories) were earlier concluded with Latvia 
and Estonia. Despite no such intentions, a part of the public opinion and 
historians regarded the signing of the agreement with the USSR as a Soviet 
protectorate over Lithuania8, which was even formulated into a saying: 
‘Our Vilnius, Russian Lithuania’9.
Until late spring of 1940 Soviet-Lithuanian relations were good but 
conducting independent foreign policy by Lithuania was very limited and 
the awareness of the presence of the Soviet troops only strengthened that 
dependence. Although the reclamation of Vilnius was depicted as a great 
diplomatic success, Lithuanian authorities did not move there, including 
president Smetona, who believed that he ‘would become a hostage’ of 
the USSR as soon as the Red Army enters the country10. Although the 
Baltic Entente, a political alliance of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (and 
military alliance between Estonia and Latvia) established in 1934, still 
existed, it did not have any political significance. There were also attempts 
of secret contacts with German authorities regarding the establishment of 
a potential protectorate as defence from the Soviet Union11 – with little effect 
because the Third Reich respected the division of influence in Europe as 
agreed in Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and in 1939 was promised a correction 
of Lithuanian-German border in the Suwałki Region12.
When in spring 1940 several disappearances and desertions of Red 
Army soldiers from Lithuanian garrisons were reported, no diplomatic 
crises broke out. The escape of Red Army soldier called Butaev, who died 
during the attempted arrest by Lithuanian police, was such a particularly 
spectacular case. Although for a long time no negative signals regarding 
these events had come from the Kremlin, a Soviet accredited representative13 
in Lithuania, Nikolai Pozdnyakov, expressed an opinion that the death of the 
Red Army soldier was a murder committed by Lithuanian police officers14.
8  A.E. Senn, Lithuania 1940. Revolution from Above, Amsterdam–New York 2007, p. 71.
9  A. Eidintas, A. Bubmblauskas, A. Kulakauskas, M. Tamošaitis, Historia Litwy, 
Vilnius 2013, p. 209.
10  A. Kastory, Złowrogie sąsiedztwo. Rosyjska polityka wobec europejskich państw ościennych 
w latach 1939–1940, Kraków 1998, p. 55.
11  Ibidem, p. 102.
12  Tajny dodatkowy protokół, in: Białe plamy. ZSRR–Niemcy 1939–1941, Vilnius 1990, 
p. 106.
13  The accredited representative (rus. полномочный представитель); so called. polpred 
(rus. польпред); representative of the USSR foreign service, holding the rank of an envoy.
14  1940 г. мая 16, Каунас – Письмо Н. Г. Позднякова В. Г. Деканозову относительно 
истории с мявшим командиром Бутаевым, in: СССР и Литва в годы второй мировой войны. 
т. I: СССР и Литовская Республика (март 1939 – август 1940 гг.), Сборник документов, 
eds. А. Каспаравичюс, Ч. Лауринавичюс, Н. Лебедева, Vilnius 2006, p. 516.
246 JULiUsz Dworacki
worries over the sPoiLs
In spring 1940, Nazi Germany began achieving spectacular successes in 
the war against Allies, taking over Denmark, Norway, Benelux countries 
and France. A particularly momentous event was the conquest of Paris. 
The successes of Hitler disrupted the implementation of Stalin’s scenario 
of a lengthy and exhausting conflict in Western Europe which, as written 
by Sławomir Dębski15 or Piotr Łossowski16, threatened the Soviet interests 
in the Baltic states. A. Dongarov and G. Peskova put forward a thesis 
that in order to protect his interests Stalin had to move his troops and 
administration into the Baltic States under the threat from Germany of 
a potential revision of areas of influence or country borders17. Mikhail 
Meltyukhov also notes that the task was facilitated due to the fact that at 
the time Great Britain and France were busy with military activity in their 
own territories which meant that the right-wing powers in Lithuania lost 
their allies18. An interesting point is brought up by Alfred Erich Senn, who 
said that the first plans of the annexation of Lithuania were developed 
in 1939 but were delayed due to the conflict with Finland and tarnished 
international reputation of the USSR19. There were also hypotheses saying 
that the occupation of the territory of the western neighbour constituted 
a part of preparations for the upcoming war with the Nazi Germany in the 
near future – it was meant to facilitate military operations in East Prussia20.
It is also worth noting that the official Soviet historiography justified 
the takeover of Lithuania by the USSR. They claimed that it was done as 
a result of a revolution, social movements and the right-wing government 
sabotaging benevolent gestures of the USSR. As early as in June 1940, such 
theses were present in messages to Moscow by polpred Pozdnyakov, who 
claimed – against facts – that as early as in October 1939 Lithuanian ‘right-
wing circles’ did everything to disrupt peaceful cooperation and create 
an anti-USSR movement21. The ‘fascist’ government allegedly rejected the 
15  S. Dębski, Między Berlinem a Moskwą. Stosunki niemiecko-sowieckie 1939–1941, 
Warszawa 2003, p. 253.
16  P. Łossowski, Tragedia Państw Bałtyckich 1939–1941, Warszawa 1990, p. 26.
17  А.Г. Донгаров, Г.Н. Пескова, СССР и страны Прибалтики, ‘Вопросы истории’ 
1991, 1, p. 42.
18  M. Мельтюхов, Прибалтийский плацдарм (1939–1940 гг.). Возвращение Советского 
Союза на берега Балтийского моря, Москва 2014, p. 616.
19  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 89.
20  B. Sokolov, The Soviet Policy Towards the Baltic States in 1939–1941, in: Northern 
European Overture to War, 1939–1941: From Memel to Barbarossa, eds. M.H. Clemmensen, 
M.S. Faulkner, Leiden–Boston 2013, p. 84.
21  И.К. Кузьмичев, op. cit., p. 29.
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peaceful attitude of the Soviet leadership, in opposition to the oppressed 
masses22. The safety aspect regarding Germany was also being brought 
up. Therefore, the ‘worker masses’ supposedly supported the claims of 
the USSR contained in a letter of 15 June23.
A certain prelude to the events of the following weeks comprised an article 
in a Soviet daily newspaper ‘Izvestia’ of 16 May, which claimed that on the 
basis of invasion of the Benelux countries by the Germany the neutrality of 
small countries in the face of conflict against a major power is impossible, 
because they cannot defend their positions, especially in the case of the 
empires turning against each other24. Furthermore, between 18 and 25 May, 
a total of 100 tanks and 250 trucks were transferred from Vilnius to Gaižiūnai, 
which could have been regarded as demonstration of force25. The West was 
also sceptical towards the neutral policy of the Baltic States – for instance, 
the deputy undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, Sir 
Orme Sargent, said that the existence of the Baltic States forms a no man’s 
land which could be used for the purpose of attacking the USSR26.
controLLeD crisis
The case of missing Red Army soldiers was used as a pretext for 
exacerbation of relations between the neighbours by the Kremlin. 
On 25 May 1940, the government of the Soviet Union issued a diplomatic 
note to the government of Lithuania, accusing it of hostile action taken 
against the Red Army stationed in Lithuania and the USSR in general. 
Lithuanian leaders were accused of kidnapping Soviet soldiers, detaining 
them and torturing them for information about troop movements. 
The Kremlin requested the practice to be ceased, the solders returned to 
their bases and the offenders punished27. The note mentioned the case 
of Butaev’s suicide, the information on two other soldiers – Nosov and 
Shmavgonyets – who were allegedly abducted by persons protected by 
Lithuanian authorities and used to organise anti-Soviet provocations28. 
22  Historia dyplomacji, p. 139.
23  Ibidem, p. 143.
24  Война расширяется, ‘Известия’ 16 V 1940, 111 (7183).
25  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 90.
26  A. Kastory, op. cit., p. 141.
27  1940 г. мая 25, Москва – Заявление В. М. Молотова в связи с исчезновениями 
красноармейцев Носова и Шмавгонца, in: СССР и Литва, p. 525.
28  Note of the Soviet Government to the Lithuanian Government, in: The USSR–German 
Aggression against Lithuania, ed. B.J. Kaslas, New York 1973, p. 176.
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On the next day, the minister of Foreign Affairs, Juozas Urbšys immediately 
offered full support in the investigation, asking for the personal data of the 
allegedly kidnapped Red Army soldiers and their respective units29, and 
on 28 May a commission for solving the case was appointed in Kaunas30. 
In spite of that, two days later ‘Izvestia’ still published an article informing 
about provocations on part of the Lithuanian government31. Due to tense 
political situation on 30 May, Urbšys appointed ambassadors in the event 
of establishing the government abroad: Stasys Lozoraitis (Rome) as the 
Head of Diplomacy, Petras Klimas (Paris) as his deputy and Jurgis Šaulys 
(Bern) as the second deputy32.
In the following days, the Soviet authorities disclosed the data 
regarding the missing soldiers but they did not match those contained 
in the note – e.g. it mentioned the name Pisarev instead of Nosov33. 
On 30 May another name, Shutov, was revealed34. Furthermore, Moscow 
sent Aleksandr Loktionov, Deputy Narkom of Defence, to investigate 
the case35. The investigation proved fruitful shortly after it began as 
Shmavgonyets was found as early as on 26 May. He reported to the 
command that on 18 May he was abducted and kept in an unknown house 
for seven days, being denied food and water for some time. On 25 May he 
was supposedly taken beyond city limits and released36. Pisarev, lost on 
24 May, in turn, was found three days later and gave a similar testimony37. 
Shutov’s fate remained unknown38. Narkom Molotov, in a message 
of 30 May also mentioned the case of Butaev and doubts regarding his 
suicide39. The Lithuanian authorities were concerned that the soldiers 
29  1940 г. мая 26, Каунас – Заявление Правительства Литвы Правительству СССР 
в ответ на заявление В. М. Молотова Л. Наткевичюсу 25 мая, in: СССР и Литва, p. 526.
30  1940 г. мая 26–30, Каунас – Дневник Н. Г. Позднякова за период с 26 до 30 мая, in: 
СССР и Литва, p. 527.
31  В Наркоминделе, ‘Известия’ 30 V 1940, 123 (7195).
32  Telegram of the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, Urbšys, to Lithuanian Diplomatic Missions 
Abroad, in: The USSR–German Aggression, p. 180.
33  1940 г. мая 26–30, Каунас – Дневник Н. Г. Позднякова за период с 26 до 30 мая, in: 
СССР и Литва, p. 528.
34  1940 г. мая 30, Каунас – Памятная записка Ю. Урбшису о переговорах 
с Н. Г. Позднякобым и заместителем наркома обороны А. Д. Локтионовым 25 и 27 мая, in: 
СССР и Литва, p. 531.
35  P. Łossowski, Kraje bałtyckie w latach przełomu 1934–1944, Warszawa 2005, p. 83.
36  1940 г. мая 30, Москва – ‘Сообщение НКИД СССР о провокационных действиях 
литовских властей, in: СССР и Литва, p. 529.
37  Ibidem, p. 530.
38  1940 г. июня 6, Москва – Сообщение Л. Наткевичюса Ю. Урбшису о беседе с В. М. 
Молотовым 4 июня, in: СССР и Литва, p. 560.
39  Communique of the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Molotov, in: 
The USSR–German Aggression, p. 185.
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were only questioned by Soviet investigators and the testimonies were 
published in press while Lithuanians had no access to the found soldiers. 
P. Łossowski therefore theorised that the government in Moscow wanted 
to avoid potential inconsistencies in testimonies which could reveal the 
provocation40. In 1965, Juozas Brazinskas, the General Prosecutor of the 
District Court in Vilnius and representative or the Ministry of Justice by 
the commission investigating the disappearances of the Soviet soldiers, 
spoke regarding the character of the abductions in an article. He stated 
that Butaev was probably bait for Lithuanian authorities which were 
supposedly misled by the Kremlin into trying to extract information 
about movements of the Red Army but he decided to run away, or he was 
convinced to do so by Western intelligence services and that he definitely 
was not murdered. The disappearance of Pisarev and Shmavgonyets were 
allegedly entirely a Soviet provocation. He also noted that the report of the 
investigation commission was sent to Moscow and was unavailable at the 
time41. A Lithuanian historian, Sigitas Jegelevičius, brought up the opinion 
regarding Butaev of Bronius Aušrotas, a former employee of Lithuanian 
military intelligence, who claimed that the Lithuanian intelligence services 
attempted to recruit the Red Army soldier as an informant but he severed 
contacts with them42.
From 2 to 5 June 1940, Lithuanian Police detained 272 people who could 
have had a connection with the abduction of the Red Army soldiers but no 
signs of anti-Soviet activity were found. The protection of Soviet bases was 
also reinforced43. In spite of that, the Soviet authorities were not satisfied 
with the actions of the Lithuanians. A particularly anti-Lithuanian attitude 
can be seen in the correspondence of polpred N. Pozdnyakov, who accused 
Smeton’s government of trying to hand the country over under German 
protectorate. In a telegram from Moscow of 2 June he suggested bringing 
more Red Army troops into the republic44. It was he whom A. E. Senn 
indicated as an originator of increasing the military presence of the USSR 
later on45. Lithuanian secret police of Saugumas, in turn, speculated in 
their report whether the actions of Moscow are a result of the increased 
40  P. Łossowski, Kraje bałtyckie, p. 84.
41  What Were Moscow’s Accusations Against Lithuania?, in: The USSR–German Aggression, 
p. 204.
42  S. Jegelevičius, Dzieje Litwy Wschodniej w latach 1939–1940 w litewskiej historiografii, 
in: ‘Studia Podlaskie’, vol. 8, Białystok 1998, p. 137. 
43  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 91.
44  1940 г. июня 2, Каунас – Телеграмма Н. Г. Позднякова в НКИД о событиях в Литве, 
in: СССР и Литва, p. 538.
45  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 92.
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influence of the Lithuanian Communist Party (Lith. Lietuvos komunistų 
partija; LKP)46. Meanwhile, British diplomats, as reported by P. Łossowski, 
informed Kaunas as early as in 3 June that the actual goal of Kremlin was 
Sovietisation of Lithuania47. At the same time, the Soviet embassy informed 
Moscow about any signs of fraternisation of the government in Kaunas with 
Germany48, the scope of German agency in the government was also being 
reported by i.a. Vincas Krėvė-Mickevičius, the future Prime Minister49. 
An official of the embassy, V. Syemyonov, accused the authorities in 
Kaunas of duplicity, sabotaging the agreement of 10 October 1939 and 
covert coordination of the anti-Soviet activity with Latvia and Estonia. 
As an example he mentioned i.a. delays in construction of the barracks for 
the Red Army50. Lithuanian authorities, unaware of the activity of Soviet 
diplomats, continued their investigation, informing Moscow about its 
progress51. 
In early June 1940, certain movements of the Red Army occurred, 
which may have indicated preparations for operation in the Baltic States. 
On 5 June, forces stationed in their territories were excluded from the group 
of Leningrad, Kalinin and Belarusian military districts and subordinated 
directly to the vice-narkom Loktionov52. There were also rumours (denied 
by ‘Izvestia’) that they moved to the German-Lithuanian border53. 
On 4–7 June, military manoeuvres were being conducted on the Soviet 
side of the border, which were interpreted by historian Boris Sokolov as 
preparations for the annexation of Lithuania and potential war with Hitler 
in summer 194054. At the same time TASS agency officially assured that the 
relations between Moscow and Berlin are good55. They also devoted efforts 
into justifying taking further action against Lithuania. On 2 June, the head 
of TASS agency, J, Hawinson, pointed out the existence of the Baltic Entente. 
46  Ibidem, p. 97.
47  P. Łossowski, Kraje bałtyckie, p. 86.
48  1940 г. июня 3, Каунас – Обзорная записка в НКИД СССР временного поверенного 
в делах СССР в Литве В. С. Семенова о внешней политике Литвы, in: СССР и Литва, p. 545.
49  Ibidem, p. 548.
50  Ibidem, p. 553.
51  1940 г. июня 4, Москва – Памятная записка Л. Наткевичюса, переданная 
В. М. Молотову, относительно мер, принятых литовскими властями для усиления 
безопасности советских воинских контингентов в Литве, in: СССР и Литва, p. 556.
52  1940 г. июня 3, Москва – Приказ наркома обороны С. К. Тимошенко No. 0028 
о переподчинении с 5 июня всех воинских частей, находящихся на территории стран 
Балтии, непосредственно наркому обороны, in: СССР и Литва, p. 539.
53  В.К. Волков, Советско–германские отношения во второй половине 1940 года, 
‘Вопросы истории’ 1997, 2, p. 3.
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55  В.К. Волков, op. cit., p. 4.
251 ‘it is aLL the faULt of LithUanian ProvocateUrs…’
Although N. Pozdnyakov clearly informed in March that there is no 
military alliance between Lithuania and the remaining Baltic states, it was 
decided that he should be used against Kaunas stating that it was the real 
nature of the English-French influence in the ‘Pribaltic’ region56. Russian 
authorities, according to B. Sokolov, delayed the operation of taking over 
Lithuania until the conclusion of military operations in France – it would 
have been risky for the USSR before that moment57. On 5 June, the Kremlin 
suggested to the Lithuanian Prime Minister Merkys that he should visit 
Moscow in order to prove friendly relations of his government with the 
USSR58.
The visit of the Prime Minster took place on 7 July. On that occasion 
narkom V. Molotov brought up further allegations against Lithuania, 
accusing it of policies hostile towards the USSR. He began from criticising 
anti-Soviet caricatures and articles in Lithuanian newspapers, stating 
that the Minister of Internal Affairs K. Skučas and A. Povilaitis must 
have known about the abductions of the Red Army soldiers and bear 
responsibility for it59. He claimed that Butaev did not commit suicide but 
was murdered60. He demanded the Lithuanian Prime Minister to take 
decisive action and dismissed the aforementioned politicians61. On 9 June, 
he accused Lithuania of an even graver matter, namely the entering of 
an anti-Soviet alliance, which was in conflict with the provisions of the 
agreement of 10 October 1939. The Narkom invoked the alleged entry 
of Kaunas into a military pact with the remaining countries of the Baltic 
Entente in December 1939 and hiding that matter from Moscow. Prime 
Minister Merkys denied the allegations, mentioning the removal of the 
third point of the agreement on the Baltic Entente regarding ‘specific 
political issues’, not subject to the doctrine of cooperation62, which occured 
at the time, during the 10th Baltic Conference – as said by Prime Minister 
56  P. Łossowski, Kraje bałtyckie, p. 89.
57  B. Sokolov, op. cit., p. 83.
58  1940 г. июня 5, Каунас – Протокол заседания Совета Министров Литовской 
Республики, in: СССР и Литва, p. 558.
59  1940 г. июня 7, Москва – ‘Из дневника В. М. Молотова. Прием наркоминделом тоб. 
В. М. Молотовым литовского премьера Меркиса’, in: СССР и Литва, p. 564.
60  1940 г. июня 8, 02:00, Москва – Шифротелеграмма премьер–министра А. Меркиса 
и Л. Наткевичюса в МИД Литвы о переговорах с В. М. Молотовым 7 июня, in: СССР 
и Литва, p. 572.
61  1940 г. июня 8, 03:00, Москва – Шифротелеграмма А. Меркиса и Л. Наткевичюса 
в МИД Литвы о предстоящей беседе с В. М. Молотовым, in: СССР и Литва, p. 573.
62  Treaty of Good Understanding and Co–operation, signed at Geneva, September 12th, 
1934, and Declaration of the same Date, ‘League of Nations – Treaty Series’ 1934–1935, 44, 
3540, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%20154/v154.pdf, p. 97 
[accessed on: 22 V 2019].
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Merkys, it also involved Vilnius63. He also denied entering into a military 
alliance with the rest of the Baltic States64.
After the meeting with V. Molotov, A Merkys returned to Kaunas for 
consultations with the government and president. A. Smetona decided to 
dismiss two aforementioned officials65 but in reality it took place as late as 
on 14 June66. They were not put on a trial67. There were discussions held 
on potential actions which could appease the Kremlin, changing the Prime 
Minister was taken into consideration, who was to be replaced by gen. 
S. Raštikis, until April 1940 the Commander of the army68. Meanwhile, 
the president tried to convince the Soviet government by mail that the 
relations between Lithuania and the USSR are good and that his country 
does not conspire with other countries69.
MoLotov’s ULtiMatUM
Introduction of the Soviet system in Lithuania was explained in later 
official historiography as a result of the revolution of the worker masses, 
who wanted closer relations with the USSR. In reality, it was the result 
of an ultimatum issued in the night of 14 to 15 June 1940 by narkom 
W. Molotov during the visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Juozas 
Urbšys at the Kremlin. The meeting was also attended by ambassadors: 
Nikolai Pozdnyakov and a Lithuanian – Ladas Natkevičius, the head 
of Soviet diplomacy accused the government of Lithuania of being 
unwilling to honour agreements under the Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 
10 October 1939, establishing an alliance with Latvia and Estonia against 
the USSR, and repressions against their own citizens. He commented on 
the clarification attempts that ‘(...) you should have acted, not exchange 
63  1940 г. июня 11, Москва – ‘Из дневника В. М. Молотова. Приём председателя Совета 
Министров Литовской Республики г. Меркыса’, in: СССР и Литва, p. 585.
64  1940 г. июня 9, Москва – ‘Из дневника В. М. Молотова. Запись беседы В. М. Молотова 
с А. Меркысом’, in: СССР и Литва, p. 574.
65  1940 г. июня 11, Москва – ‘Из дневника В. М. Молотова. Приём председателя Совета 
Министров Литовской Республики г. Меркыса’, in: СССР и Литва, p. 580.
66  1940 г. июня 14, 14 час., Москва – ‘Из дневника В. Г. Деканозова. Приём министра 
иностранных дел Литвы Урбшиса’, in: СССР и Литва, p. 593.
67  1940 г. июня 11, Москва – ‘Из дневника В. М. Молотова. Приём председателя Совета 
Министров Литовской Республики г. Меркыса’, in: СССР и Литва, p. 582.
68  1940 г. июня 12, Москва – Шифротелеграмма Ю. Урбшиса в МИД Литвы о ходе 
переговоров в Москве и их перспективах, in: СССР и Литва, p. 586.
69  Letter of President Smetona of Lithuania to M. I. Kalinin, Chairman of the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., in: The USSR–German Aggression, p. 181.
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pleasantries. The Lithuanian government apparently did not realise 
the gravity of the situation’. He also accused him of responsibility for 
the ‘abduction’ of the Soviet soldiers in the preceding weeks he also 
‘sympathised with’ the civilian services – Lithuanian citizens employed 
at the Soviet garrisons whom the Lithuanian police also supposedly 
questioned and put in concentration camps. Narkom demanded the 
following actions to be taken: arresting and putting on trial the Minister 
of Internal Affairs, Kazys Skučas and the head of the security service, 
Augustinas Povilaitis – the ministers who were earlier blamed for the 
disappearance of the Red Army soldiers, formation of a new government 
which would be able to implement the provisions of the Treaty of 10 
October and establishment of free access to the territory of Lithuania for 
the Red Army for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Treaty of 
Mutual Assistance70. Regarding the change of the government, Molotov 
said directly that its composition had to be consulted with the government 
in Moscow, mentioning his deputy, Vladimir Dekanozov71, either 
directly or via the Soviet embassy. Regarding the comment of J. Urbšys, 
mentioning the lack of legal grounds for trial of the two mentioned 
ministers, the head of Soviet diplomacy answered with complete sincerity 
that: ‘they have to be arrested and brought to court, and appropriate 
charges can always be found. Soviet lawyers can even help you with 
that after familiarising themselves with the Lithuanian code.’ Molotov 
announced that the Kremlin awaits the answer until morning, and that the 
lack of the abovementioned would mean the execution of the ultimatum. 
He also stated that ‘it is all the fault of Lithuanian provocateurs such as 
Skučas and others’, who ‘are not just the enemies of the Soviet Union 
but also Lithuania itself’72. He also said that the Red Army would enter 
Lithuania regardless of the decision of the Lithuanian government73.
The government in Kaunas did not have the resources to fight. Ac-
cording to estimates, Lithuanian armed forces counted about 28 thou-
70  1940 г. июня 14, 23 часа 50 минут, Москва – ‘Из дневника В. М. Молотова. Приём 
председателем Совнаркома Союза СССР и наркоминделом тов. В. М. Молотовым 
министра иностранных дел Литовской Республики г. Урбшиса’, in: СССР и Литва, p. 599.
71  J. Urbšys, Lithuania and the Soviet Union 1939–1940: The Fateful Year. Memoirs by 
Juozas Urbšys, ed. Sigita Naujokaitis, ‘Lituanus – Lithuanian Quarterly Journal of Arts and 
Sciences’, 34, 2 (Summer 1989), http://www.lituanus.org/1989/89_2_03.htm [accessed on: 
22 V 2019].
72  1940 г. июня 14, 23 часа 50 минут, Москва – ‘Из дневника В. М. Молотова. Приём 
председателем Совнаркома Союза СССР и наркоминделом тов. В. М. Молотовым 
министра иностранных дел Литовской Республики г. Урбшиса’, in: СССР и Литва, p. 597.
73  P. Łossowski, Tragedia Państw, p. 28.
254 JULiUsz Dworacki
sand74. The number was only marginally larger than Red Army forces al-
ready stationed in the country. The Commander-in-Chief of the Lithua-
nian army – gen. Vincas Vitkauskas and his predecessor Stasys Raštikis 
decided after the ultimatum that armed resistance and human casualties 
would not have been worth it. Alfonsas Eidintas theorises that they did 
not want to fight the USSR in fear of conflict with their potential ally in 
the future75. It also needs to be noted that the USSR was already pre-
paring for the operation by establishing hospitals for the wounded and 
camps for prisoners and – most likely – also organising sabotage groups 
in Lithuanian cities76. Prime Minister A. Merkys also intended to avoid 
armed resistance while President A. Smetona thought otherwise77. In the 
end the ultimatum was accepted and the government was dismissed. 
The candidacy of gen. S. Raštikis was proposed once again (V. Vitkaus-
kas would have become the Minister of War) but Molotov opposed the 
candidacy78.
Notable in the issue of the invasion of the Baltic States by the Soviet 
Union seems the sequence of introducing regular forces into these 
countries. In autumn 1939, signing of the mutual assistance treaties was 
being conducted north to south, starting from Estonia. The events of June, 
in turn, began from the ultimatum issued to Lithuania79, and only then 
the Soviet forces entered Latvia and Estonia. This was apparently caused 
by Stalin’s uncertainty regarding the security of territorial spoils from 
Nazi Germany80, as well as the intention of creating a staging ground for 
a potential future war with the Third Reich81.
after accePting the ULtiMatUM
As a result of complying with the demands of the Kremlin, the structure 
of the government was significantly changed. The most significant was the 
escape of President Antanas Smetona to Germany which led to his position 
74  Вооружённые силы Литвы 1939–1940 гг., ‘Руниверс.ru’, http://www.runivers.ru/
doc/d2.php?SECTION_ID=6370&PORTAL_ID=6369 [accessed on: 22 V 2019].
75  A. Eidintas et al., op. cit., p. 212.
76  Ibidem, p. 211.
77  P. Łossowski, Tragedia Państw, p. 28.
78  A. Eidintas et al., op. cit., p. 211.
79  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 82.
80  P. Łossowski, Tragedia Państw, p. 26.
81  М. Мельтюхов, Упущенный шанс Сталина. Советский Союз и борьба за Европу: 
1939–1941, Москва 2000, http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/index.html [accessed 
on: 22 V 2019].
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being temporarily taken over by the Prime Minister Merkys82. In his 
memorandum, the German ambassador in Kaunas, Erich Zechlin, noted that 
the head of the Lithuanian state escaped across the border to East Prussia83. 
The president allegedly carried orders for garrisons in Marijampolė and 
Tauragė to cross the German border armed and ready84. However, Smetona 
did not formally resign from the position of the head of the state, which led the 
government to claim that the president renounced his position85. Smetona, 
staying in bordering city of Eydtkuhnen (nowadays Chernyshevskoye in 
Kaliningrad Oblast)86, received help from the ambassador in Berlin, Kazys 
Škirpa in receiving asylum in the Third Reich87. Kept together with 17 other 
people, Smetona allegedly openly expressed pro-German views 88. 
As per demands of the Kremlin, ministers Skučas and Povilaitis were 
arrested during their preparations to escape across the border to East 
Prussia89. The aforementioned decision, according to A. E. Senn, was not 
ordered by Dekanozov but Merkys and it is the Prime Minister whom 
the historian blames for the first actions at the highest political levels90. 
It is worth noting that if the testimonies of E. Zechlin are true, the Soviet 
commissars allegedly entered all government offices in Kaunas91.
reD arMy enters LithUania
First operations involving the entry of the Red Army troops began 
as early as on 15 June at about 1592. The progress of the operation was 
supposedly reported to i.a. gen. V. Vitkauskas, with whom the future 
82  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 105.
83  Memorandum by the German Minister in Kaunas, Zechlin, in: The USSR–German 
Aggression, p. 226.
84  Memorandum of an Official of the German Foreign Ministry on a Communique of the 
German Supreme Military Command, in: The USSR–German Aggression, p. 217.
85  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 108.
86  Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 
Woermann, in: The USSR–German Aggression, p. 219.
87  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 109.
88  1940 г. июля 13, Каунас. – Памятная записка дипкурьера Ю. Юргиниса В. Креве–
Мицкевичюсу о результатах его пребывания в Берлине и знакомстве с положением дел в 
литовской миссии, in: СССР и Литва, p. 681.
89  The U.S. Minister in Kaunas, Norem, to the U.S. Secretary of State, Hull, in: The USSR–
German Aggression, p 215.
90  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 109.
91  Memorandum by the German Minister in Kaunas, Zechlin, in: The USSR–German 
Aggression, p. 226.
92  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 99.
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distribution of troops was discussed93. The entry was mostly orderly 
though there were several incidents, including shots fired at the border 
post near Alytus94, the execution of policeman Aleksas Barauskas in the 
village of Ūta near Varėna95, or the arrest of policeman Jonas Aleknavičius 
near Eišiškės96. On 18 June, at one of the border crossing, the Lithuanian 
Coat of Arms – Vytis (pol. Pogoń, blr. Pahonia) was destroyed97. 
The operation took about 24 hours98. The Lithuanian army, as ordered by 
gen. Vitkauskas, did not resist99. On 17 June, Narkom of Defence of the 
USSR, marshal Semyon Timoshenko suggested to the Political Bureau of 
Soviet Communist Party that the Red Army should establish control over 
the border with East Prussia as soon as possible, disarm the armed forces 
of the Baltic republics and establish the Baltic Special Military District 
with headquarters in Riga100. In the next few days the forces of the Red 
Army took over Latvia and Estonia101. Generally the area of the Baltic 
States was occupied by a total of 500 thousand soldiers102. Soviet press 
reported that the armies were enthusiastically welcomed by the local 
population, who celebrated the overthrow of the oppressive bourgeois 
regime103. Soon after the entry of the Red Army, the new government 
93  1940 г. июня 15, 12 час. 30 мин., Москва – ‘Из дневника В. М. Молотова. Приём 
тов. Молотовым министра иностранных дел Литвы Урбшиса и литовского посланника в 
Москве Наткевичюса’, in: СССР и Литвa, p. 604.
94  1940 г. июня 15, Каунас – Шифротелеграмма Э. Тураускаса в Миссию Литвы 
в Москве о нападении красноармейцев на литовский пограничный пункт и расправе со 
старшим полицейским А. Бараускасом, in: СССР и Литва, p. 610.
95  Ibidem, p. 611.
96  1940 г. июня 15, Каунас – Шифротелеграмма Э. Тураускаса в Миссию Литвы в 
Москве относительно похищения красноармейцами полицейского Й. Алекнавичюса, in: 
СССР и Литва, p. 612.
97  1940 г. июля 1, Каунас. – Нота МИД Литовской Республики Полпредцтву СССР 
по поводу случая сброса литовского герба с пограничного столба при переходе 18 июня 
советскими войсками литовской границы, in: СССР и Литва, p. 568.
98  1940 г. июня, ночь с 15 на 16, Минск. – Выписка из боевого приказа командования 
БОВО войскам 3–й и 11–й армий и 16–му особому стрелковому корпусу о занято 
территории Литвы, in: СССР и Литва, p. 617.
99  1940 г. июня 15, Каунас – Из приказа командующего Литовской армией генерала 
В. Виткаускаса о соблюдении вежливости в отношении воинских частей СССР, вводимых 
на территорию Литвы, in: СССР и Литва, p. 610.
100  1940 г. июня 17, Москва. – Записка С. К. Тимошенко в Политбюро ЦК ВКП(б) и 
СНК СССР в связи с вводом советских войск в Прибалтийские республики, in: СССР и 
Литва, p. 624.
101  The U.S. Charge D’Affairs in Estonia, Leonard, to the U.S. Secretary of State, Hull, in: The 
USSR–German Aggression, p. 214.
102  Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of Division of European Affairs of the U.S. State 
Department, Henderson, in: The USSR–German Aggression, p. 232.
103  Прибытие частей Красной армии в Литву, ‘Известия’ 17.06.1940, 138 (7210).
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of Lithuania ordered the seizure of the property of those who fled the 
country104.
On 17 June, V. Dekanozov, already as a special envoy of the Kremlin 
in Lithuania105, ordered the change in the structure of the government. 
However, the real power remained in the hands of Dekanozov himself, as 
well as Pozdnyakov and the NKVD chief deputy – Vsevolod Merkulov. 
The legality of the actions of the Soviet representative and the deputy 
head of diplomacy was justified by the flight of president Smetona106. In 
the next few weeks A. Merkys, J. Urbšys and A. Voldemaras were taken 
to the USSR. It is worth noting that shortly after the seizure of the Baltic 
States, a meeting between Dekanozov and his counterparts in Latvia and 
Estonia – Andrey Vyshinsky and Andrey Zhdanov took place in Riga for 
the purpose of coordinating actions in ‘their own’ countries107.
Interestingly enough, in contacts between Soviet and German diplomats 
a different version of events was maintained, namely, that the takeover of 
Lithuania was meant to end the French and English schemes. It was also 
noted that the actions of Kaunas could turn Germany and the USSR against 
each other108. On 18 June, Molotov congratulated the German Secretary of 
the State, Ernst von Weizsäcker on the success of the Third Reich in France 
while informing that the Soviet activity in Lithuania was motivated by the 
intention of bringing the mistrust between the two countries to an end109. 
On 23 June, the TASS agency denied the reports which stated that Red 
Army troops are being concentrated on the Lithuanian-German Border, 
adding that nothing will tarnish the good relations established by the non-
aggression treaty of 23 August 1939110. German diplomats were curious as 
to why the USSR decided to carry out the operation exactly in June 1940. 
It was well-known in Germany that the accusations regarding the military 
alliance of Lithuania with Latvia and Estonia are false, suggesting that 
the problem could have lied in Lithuanian-German economic contacts111. 
German ambassador in Moscow, Friedrich-Werner von der Schulenburg 
claimed that the Soviet authorities wanted complete control over the Baltic 
104  Мероприятия литовского правительства, ‘Известия’ 07.07.1940, 155 (7227).
105  Ambasador Schulenburg do MSZ Niemiec, in: Białe plamy, p. 177.
106  A. Eidintas et al., op. cit., p. 215.
107  P. Łossowski, Tragedia Państw, p. 39.
108  Беседа наркома иностранных дел СССР В. М. Молотова с послом Германии в СССР 
Ф. Шуленбургом, in: Документы Внешней Политики, 1940 год, vol. XXIII, книга I, Москва 
1995 [hereinafter: ДВП 1940, кн. I].
109  The German Ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, to the State Secretary of the German 
Foreign Ministry, Weizsäcker, in: The USSR–German Aggression, p. 225.
110  Сообщение ТАСС, in: ДВП 1940, кн. I, p. 363.
111  MSZ Niemiec do Ribbentropa, in: Białe plamy, p. 175.
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States before the potential end of the war in Europe stating that these 
countries will soon be incorporated into the USSR112. However, as written 
in a memorandum on 26 June by Kazys Škirpa, no reaction from the Third 
Reich was to be expected in relation to the situation because the Baltic 
States were not a part of Berlin’s political goals113.
the sUMMer sovietisation of LithUania
The ‘reforms’ in Lithuania led to deep transformations in executive 
power. Prime Minister Antanas Merkys was dismissed and replaced with 
a leftist and pro-Kremlin journalist, Justas Paleckis, while Vincas Krėvė-
Mickevičius, Dean of the Department of Humanities of the University of 
Vilnius (formerly Stefan Batory University) was appointed as his deputy 
and head of diplomacy. Both actively cooperated with Soviet diplomats 
and services for an extended period of time, though the latter gradually 
became more critical towards the actions of Moscow as the Sovietisation 
of the country progressed114. The position of the Commander-in-Chief and 
Minister of National Defence was given to Gen. Vincas Vitkauskas, Head 
of the Ministry of Justice – Povilas Pakarklis, Finance and Communication 
– Ernestas Galvanauskas, Internal Affairs and Agriculture – Matas Mickis, 
Health – Leonas Koganas115. 
Due to the provisions in the constitution, Prime Minister Paleckis became 
an acting head of the state, whereas Krėvė-Mickevičius served as the deputy 
head of the government. Actual power, however, was still in the hands of 
Dekanozov. The new head of the government was under complete control 
of the Kremlin, an example of which can be illustrated by the order issued 
to Paleckis regarding the request for assistance from the USSR in securing 
the border with Germany116. Anyway, the ambassador of Lithuania in Berlin 
described how polpred Pozdnyakov, controlled by Dekanozov, delivered 
guidelines to the government117. The head of the National Defence and 
Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Vincas Vitkauskas completely submitted to the 
112  Ambasador Schulenburg do Sekretarza Stanu Weiszäckera, in: Białe plamy, p. 188.
113  1940 г. июня 26, 18 часов, Берлин. – 18 часов, Берлин. – Меморандум К. Шкирпы 
министру иностранных дел и генеральному секретарю МИД Литвы, in: СССР и Литва, 
p. 651.
114  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 139.
115  1940 г. июня 17, Каунас. – Памятная записка МИД Литовской Республики 
Полпредцтву СССР в Литве о составе нового Правительства, in: СССР и Литва, p. 626.
116  А.Г. Донгаров, Г.Н. Пескова, СССР и страны Прибалтики, p. 45.
117  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 126.
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Soviet authority, on 19 June he declared that the army shall support the new 
government118. Actions of the USSR were met with approval of Lithuanian 
communists expressing a view that the occupation of Lithuania by the USSR 
was necessary in order to improve the chances of Kaunas (and Moscow) 
against Germans who were supported by bourgeois119.
In the early period after the transformation the new leadership of the 
state and Soviet ‘advisors’ tried to justify their actions by intending to 
overthrow the dictatorship of A. Smetona120. Later it was claimed that ‘the 
revolution’ was supposedly initiated by the people121. It was said that the 
Baltic republics had to be set free from bourgeois and capitalist rule and 
changed into a forward defence point of the USSR122. Antanas Sniečkus 
said on 13 July that the Soviet Union would allow the people to bring the 
22-year rule of reactionists to an end123. It was declared that Lithuania would 
maintain normal relations with all countries, including the friendship with 
the Soviet Union which was in alliance with Kaunas. Dissolution of the 
Seimas and new elections were also announced124. The announced reforms 
were meant to serve ‘the political transformation of a system which used 
to be against the interest of the people’125. 
Meanwhile, Dekanozov worked on strengthening the Communist party 
in Lithuania126. Political prisoners were gradually being released127, LKP was 
legalised on 26 June128, and shortly after the Komsomol as well129. The problem 
of the Communists lied in how difficult it was to prove a bottom-up revolution 
with the participation of the LKP while its leader, Antanas Sniečkus, spent 
the last few months in prison. Apart from that, the party was decimated 
118  Ibidem, p. 145.
119  1940 г. июня 15, Паневежис – Сводка Паневежского окружного отделения 
государственной безопасности и криминальной полиции о настроении населения в связи с 
советское–литовскими переговорами, in: СССР и Литва, p. 613.
120  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 134.
121  A. Chubarian, Soviet Foreign Policy, September 1939 – June 1941, or a Special Kind of 
Neutrality, in: Neutrality in History: Proceedings on the Conference of Neutrality organized in 
Helsinki 9–12 September 1992 under the auspices of the Comission of History of International 
Relations, ed. J. Nevakivi, Helsinki 1993, p. 288.
122  А.Г. Донгаров, Г.Н. Пескова, СССР и страны Прибалтики, p. 44.
123  Excerpts from a Speech by the First Secretary of the Central Comitee of the Lithuanian 
Communist Party, Sniečkus, in: The USSR–German Aggression, p. 236.
124  1940 г. июня 18, Каунас. – Заявление и.о. президента Литовской Республики премьер–
министра Ю. Палецкиса, in: СССР и Литва, p. 630.
125  Декларация литовского правительства, ‘Известия’ 20 VI 1940, 140 (7212).
126  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 127.
127  Освобождение политических заключенных, ‘Известия’ 20 VI 1940, 140 (7212).
128  Декларация литовского правительства, ‘Известия’ 27 VI 1940, 146 (7218). 
129  Декларация литовского правительства, ‘Известия’ 30 VI 1940, 149 (7221).
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by purges and conflicted regarding the composition of the government 
and the absence of Sniečkus in it. On 17 June, the head of the Comintern, 
Georgi Dimitrov sent a message to the activists of the LKP stating that in 
order to establish people’s democracy the communists should not enter the 
government, but instead organise in cities and villages. He also ordered 
the activists should obey Dekanozov. A. Sniečkus received the position of 
the head of Saugumas, the secret police, as ‘consolation’. He took up the 
leadership of the party only on 14 August but he remained a major member 
of the Communist Lithuania until 1974130. Before Communists officially 
seized power, as reported by Andrzej Kastory, there were confiscations of 
private property, people were removed from their apartments under the 
pretext of ‘removing the enemy of the people’, and representatives of local 
governments and public officials were being dismissed131.
During the transitional period, namely, in early July 1940, the 
Lithuanian society was of the opinion that the independence of the country 
would be maintained132. Members of the new people’s government 
and the Communist party even thought that Lithuania would formally 
become an independent state, though under control of the USSR133. 
Meanwhile, the Sovietisation of the country progressed at a rapid rate. 
A telling sign of that was the stationing of Soviet border service soldiers 
on the German border as early as in 22 June134. The media authorities were 
quickly changed: ELTA agency and ‘Lietuvos Aidas’ newspaper135, and 
several other titles were shut down until the end of the month136, shortly 
afterwards the Communist paper ‘Darbo Lietuva’ became an official 
government authority137. Also ordered were administrative reforms – as 
early as on 19 June the government officially announced purges in offices 
and the will to replace the current officials with ‘patriots’. Introduction 
of free healthcare and higher education were also announced138, Ministry 
of Labour was established139. Agricultural reform was announced as well, 
130  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 160.
131  A. Kastory, op. cit., p. 117.
132  A. Eidintas et al., op. cit., p. 213.
133  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 149.
134  1940 г. июня ранее 22, Москва – Каунас. – Запись разговора по прямому проводу В. М. 
Молотова с В. Г. Деканозовым и Н. Г. Поздняковым о курсе лита, А. Вольдемарасе и замене 
литовских пограничников советскими, in: СССР и Литва, p. 638.
135  Новые назначения в Литве, ‘Правда’ 20 VI 1940, 170 (8216). 
136  Мероприятия литовского правительства, ‘Известия’ 30 VI 1940, 149 (7221).
137  Новый официоз литовского правительства, ‘Правда’ 16 VII 1940, 196 (8242).
138  Мероприятия литовского правительства, ‘Известия’ 21 VI 1940, 141 (7213).
139  Воззвание литовского министерства труда, ‘Известия’ 5 VII 1940, 153 (7225).
261 ‘it is aLL the faULt of LithUanian ProvocateUrs…’
the implementation of which began in August 1940140. Changes involved 
also foreign affairs – in early July the Baltic states withdrew from treaties 
forming the Baltic Entente (Lithuania did that on 3 July)141, and on 7 July 
the Concordat with the Vatican was revoked142. After the elections to the 
People’s Seimas, the nationalisation of banks was conducted143.
Transformation also reached the Army of Lithuania – the establishment 
of People’s Army’s was announced144, which would not ‘fight the nation’ 
like during Smetona’s times and that it would be politically active. What 
is more, introduced in the army were political commissars (politruks)145. 
On 11 June, the activity of the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union (šauliai) was sus-
pended as well146. Changes would also involve economic matters. In June, 
the Kremlin already issued an order for the introduction of the rouble on 
equal terms to the litas147. However, this solution was met with the protest 
of minister E. Galvanauskas, therefore it was not introduced. The minister 
was removed from the office on 5 July148. Ultimately the litas was replaced 
by the rouble on 25 March 1941149.
Also worth noting are the first actions regarding cultural and national 
policies. On 28 June, the authorities of Soviet Communist Party issued an 
order to organize in the Baltic states the radio broadcasts in Lithuanian, 
Latvian and Estonian languages150. In July, ‘Truzhenik’ newspaper was 
introduced, which was based on an earlier title, ‘Krasnoye Znamya’151. 
What is interesting, the new government declared departure from 
140  Литва сегодня, ‘Правда’ 12 VIII 1940, 223 (8269).
141  Эстония расторгла ‘Договор единодушия и сотрудничества’ между Эстонией, 
Латвией и Литвой, ‘Известия’ 2 VII 1940, 150 (7222); Расторжение военно–оборонительного 
союза между Латвией и Эстонией, ‘Правда’ 2 VII 1940, 182 (8228); Аннулирование Литвой 
‘Договора единодушии и сотрудничества’, ‘Известия’ 4 VII 1940, 152 (7224).
142  Мероприятия литовского правительства, ‘Известия’ 7 VII 1940, 155 (7227). 
143  Национализация банков в Литве, ‘Известия’ 26 VII 1940, 171 (7243).
144  A. Eidintas et al., op. cit., p. 218.
145  Реорганизация литовской армии, ‘Известия’ 4 VII 1940, 152 (7224).
146  Мероприятия литовского правительства, ‘Известия’ 14 VII 1940, 161 (7233).
147  1940 г. июня 19, Каунас. – Шифротелеграмма министра иностранных дел Литвы 
В. Креве–Мицкевичюса Л. Наткевичюсу, in: СССР и Литва, p. 635.
148  1940 г. июля 5, 23 час. 45 мин., Каунас. – Телефонограмма В. Г. Деканозова и Н. Г. 
Позднякова в НКИД СССР о решениях, принятых на заседании Совета Министров 
Литовской Республики, in: СССР и Литва, p. 662.
149  H. Wisner, Litwa i Litwini: szkice z dziejów państwa i narodu, Olsztyn 1991, p. 210.
150  1940 г. июня 28, Москва – Пункт 13 протокола No. 18 решений ЦК ВКП(б) 
‘О радиопередачах на литовском, латышском и эстонском языках’, in: СССР и Литва, p. 655.
151  1940 г. июля 10, 18 час. 50 мин., Каунас. – Телефонограмма по ВЧ В.Г. Деканозова 
и Н. Г. Позднякова В. М. Молотову о мероприятиях по организации избирательной 
кампании в Литве, in: СССР и Литва, p. 672.
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chauvinism against Poles152, while the election platform, Union of the 
Working People of Lithuania, promoted friendship and common goals of 
all nations inhabiting Lithuania153. 
eLections to the PeoPLe’s seiMas
As announced by the new government, on 1 July the order of 
27 June on dissolution of the Seimas was published154, and on 5 July the 
government set a date of parliamentary elections to the People’s Seimas, 
as early as on 14 July155. On the same day, the head of diplomacy, Krėvė-
Mickevičius, who tried to delay the elections for as long as possible156, 
submitted a request for dismissal from the position but it was suspended. 
The decision of the minister most likely was related with his meeting 
with Molotov on 30 June in Moscow during which he learned about the 
annexation plans of his country by the USSR. Narkom of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs stated: ‘Russian tsars, starting from Ivan the Terrible, 
marched towards the Baltic Sea not because of personal ambitions 
but the needs of the state and Russian nation. It would be inexcusable 
if the Soviet Union did not make use of the opportunity which might 
never repeat. The Soviet leaders decided to incorporate the Baltic States 
into the family of Soviet republics’. Molotov also emphasised the lack 
of justifications for the existence of neutral countries and noted that 
Germany accepts the actions regarding Lithuania157. Many years later, 
Krėvė-Mickevičius wrote that upon the arrival of the Red Army the 
independence of Lithuania became fiction158.
On the same day, a new law regarding parliamentary elections and 
composition of the Central Electoral Commission was adopted159. Over 
152  P. Łossowski, Litwa a sprawy polskie 1939–1940, Warszawa 1982, p. 327.
153  Обращение группы ‘Союз трудового народа Литвы’ к литовскому народу, ‘Известия’ 
11 VII 1940, 158 (7230).
154  M. Мельтюхов, Прибалтийский плацдарм, p. 529.
155  Выборы в литовский Сейм, ‘Известия’ 6 VII 1940, 154 (7226).
156  1940 г. июля 5, 7 час. 30 мин., Каунас. – Телефонограмма по ВЧ В. Г. Деканозова 
в НКИД СССР о переговорах с Ю. Палецкисом и В. Креве–Мицкиевичюсом, in: СССР 
и Литва, p. 659.
157  A. Kastory, op. cit., p. 119.
158  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 124.
159  1940 г. июля 5, 7 час. 30 мин., Каунас. – Телефонограмма по ВЧ В. Г. Деканозова 
в НКИД СССР о переговорах с Ю. Палецкисом и В. Креве–Мицкиевичюсом, in: СССР 
и Литва, p. 659.
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the next few days district and regional commissions were established160. It 
was determined in the Kremlin that the new legislative authority would 
comprise 79 members (1 per each 35 thousand inhabitants). Dekanozov 
and Pozdnyakov’s telegram to the authority in Moscow contained the 
proportional composition of the future Seimas: up to 40 Communists, 
5 Komsomolets, 35-38 non-partisans. What is interesting, the proportions 
were also determined by job (13-15 machinery workers, 23-25 peasants, 
4 solders, 21 representatives of intelligentsia, 18 officials) and by nationality 
(65 Lithuanians, 5 Poles, 5 Jews, 2 Russians, 2 Latvians). Women were also 
included – 8 in the new Seimas161. Candidates were placed in a list named 
Union of the Working People of Lithuania (Lith. Lietuvos liaudies darbo 
sąjunga), because LKP did not have a list of its own. Most of them were 
associated with the Communist and leftist movement162. One of them was 
the Minister of National Defence, Gen. Vitkauskas163.
The short campaign included regularly organised meetings at work-
places and demonstrations in cities. Press articles covered meetings of 
workers, peasants and soldiers, as well as greetings from the assemblies of 
Lithuanian emigrants in i.a. the USA164. Dekanozov and Pozdnyakov also 
informed the Kremlin about the demonstrations165.
Election to the People’s Seimas was held on Sunday, 14 June 1940. 
An important element of providing legitimacy of the voting conducted under 
Kremlin’s control was keeping the attendance high. The head of the police 
in Marijampolė, Jurgis Glušauskas, mentioned 13 years after the elections 
that the voting was supervised by NKVD officers who were backed up by 
the military. They also had orders to bring people to polling stations and 
those who would remain at home were threatened with displacement166. In 
spite of that, due to shortages in equipment and constant rain which washed 
160  1940 г. июля 9, Каунас – Телефонограмма по ВЧ В.Г. Деканозова и Н. Г. Позднякова в 
НКИД СССР о мероприятиях по организации избирательной кампании в Литве, in: СССР 
и Литва, p. 667.
161  1940 г. июля 7, 13 час. 15 мин., Каунас – Телефонограмма по ВЧ В.Г. Деканозова и 
Н. Г. Позднякова в НКИД СССР о будущем составе нового Сейма, in: СССР и Литва, p. 665.
162  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 214.
163  List of Delegates Elected by the People’s Seimas to Present the Petition for Incorporation to 
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in: The USSR–German Aggression, p. 244.
164  Приветствия литовцев, латышей и эстонцев, живущих в США, ‘Известия’ 11 VII 
1940, 158 (7230).
165  1940 г. июля 7, 13 час. 30 мин., Каунас – Телефонограмма по ВЧ В.Г. Деканозова и 
Н. Г. Позднякова И. В. Сталину и В. М. Молотову о митинге в Каунасе, in: СССР и Литва, 
p. 666.
166  The Lithuanian Minister in Washington, Žadeikis, to the U.S. Secretary of State, Hull, in: 
The USSR–German Aggression, p. 230.
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roads out167, according to Glušauskas, the attendance rate was between 5 
and 15% of eligible voters168. Even Prime Minister Paleckis had to admit that 
it ranged between 16 and 18%. Due to that fact, the voting was extended 
until the following day169. The result was ‘phenomenal’, the attendance was 
drastically improved – e.g. in Panevezys (106%) or in Biržai (123%)170. On 
national scale it was at 99%171. The official result indicated the victory of the 
Union of the Working People of Lithuania with 99.2% of votes172. 
the first soviet rePUbLic anD annexation
The first session of the newly elected People’s Seimas was planned to be 
held on 21 July173. After the commencement of the session, two laws were 
approved: the adoption of a Soviet political system in Lithuania and a request 
to the USSR for inclusion of the country to the Union. These decisions 
were approved unanimously174. The topic of incorporation of Lithuania 
to the Soviet Union entered the public discourse shortly after the elections 
and the ‘victory’ of the Communists. The establishment of a Lithuanian 
Soviet Socialist Republic (LSSR) was proclaimed as early as on 21 July, the 
appropriate declaration was signed by Justas Paleckis as Prime Minister and 
acting President and Vincas Krėvė-Mickevičius as the deputy head of the 
state175. At the same time, the parliaments of Latvia and Estonia issued similar 
declarations. From that moment the Soviet press devoted a lot of attention 
to the three new Soviet republics, writing about them as if they were already 
a part of the Soviet Union. They also published congratulations both to the 
representatives of the authorities as well as workplaces in the entire USSR176.
167  1940 г. июля 14, 22 час. 30 мин., Каунас. – Телефонограмма по ВЧ В.Г. Деканозова и Н. Г. 
Позднякова И. В. Сталину и В. М. Молотову о выборах в Сейм, in: СССР и Литвa, p. 684.
168  The Lithuanian Minister in Washington, Žadeikis, to the U.S. Secretary of State, Hull, in: 
The USSR–German Aggression, p. 230.
169  G. Błaszczyk, Litwa współczesna, Poznań 1992, p. 108.
170  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 219.
171  The U.S. Minister in Kaunas, Norem, to the U.S. Secretary of State, Hull, in: The USSR–
German Aggression, p. 233.
172  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 220.
173  The U.S. Minister in Kaunas, Norem, to the U.S. Secretary of State, Hull, in: The USSR–
German Aggression, p. 233.
174  1940 г. июля 21, Каунас. – Телефонограмма по ВЧ В.Г. Деканозова и Н. Г. Позднякова 
в НКИД СССР об итогах первого дня работы ‘Народного Сейма’, in: СССР и Литва, p. 692.
175  Resolution of the People’s Seimas of Lithuania, in: The USSR–German Aggression, p. 240.
176  Трудящиеся Советского Союза выражают готовность принять в свою семью 
Литовскую, Латвийскую и Эстонскую Советские Социалистические Республики, 
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The process of formal incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and areas 
of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina (as SSR of Moldova) was conducted 
on the 7th Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Each country was 
incorporated on a separate day. In Lithuania’s case, the Delegation of the 
People’s Seimas submitted an appropriate request to the Supreme Soviet 
on 3 August177. On the same day they considered and approved the request 
while ordering the election of members of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet 
Union from the LSSR and the correction of borders with Soviet Belarus178. 
These are the circumstances in which Lithuania lost its independence179. This 
step was somewhat announced – i.a. on 26 June the USSR refused granting 
permission on resettlement of Lithuanians from bordering areas of Belarus180 
– apparently the action was considered unnecessary. It is worth noting 
that the session of the Soviet on 1 August began with Molotov’s lecture on 
foreign policy of the Soviet Union in which he praised the success of the 
‘peace and neutrality’ politics of the Kremlin and the victory over ‘bourgeois’ 
rule of the Baltic states by the People in ‘free’ elections. Also notable is the 
following statement regarding the increase of the population of the country 
by 23 million people and regarding also the people of Western Belarus and 
Ukraine: ‘It should be highlighted that 19/20 of the population was previously 
a part of the USSR but they were forcefully seized in the moment weakness 
of its military by imperialist countries of the West. Now those people are 
reunited with the Soviet Union’181. Prime Minister Paleckis also addressed 
177  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 239.
178  Закон Союза Советских Социалистических Республик, in: ДВП 1940, кн. I, p. 472.
179  It is worth noting that the annexations of the Baltic states were conducted shortly 
one after the other, and in the last stage they were well coordinated in time. Similarly to 
Lithuanian agreement of 10 October 1939, USSR signed one with Estonia on 28 September 
and Latvia on 5 October 1939. Those also implied the establishment of Soviet military bases 
on the territory of these countries. The Red Army entered Latvia and Estonia on 16 June 1940, 
as in Lithuania’s case – after giving an ultimatum to governments of Riga and Tallinn. Rigged 
parliamentary elections in these countries were held on 14-15 July. Final annexation of the 
republics took place on 5 August (Latvia) and 6 August (Estonia), also during the 7th Session 
of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The process was also coordinated with the incorporation 
of Romanian Bessarabia to the USSR which was taken on 28 June 1940 by the Red Army after 
giving an ultimatum by the Kremlin to Bucharest, and which was finally incorporated into 
the Soviet Union on 2 August, after the establishment of Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.
180  1940 г. июля 26, Москва. – Записка Л. П. Берии относительно желательности 
отменить решение Политбюро ВКП(б) от 23 мая 1940 г. об эвакуации граждан литовской 
национальности из приграничных областей БССР с оформлением на ней соответствующего 
решения Политбюро ЦК ВКП(б) от 29 июня (пункт 118 протокола No. 19), in: СССР 
и Литва, p. 704.
181  Седьмая Сессия Верховного Совета СССР 1–го созыва. Внешняя политика Советского 
Союза. Доклад–Председателя Совета Народных Комиссаров и Народного Комиссара 
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the time of the civil war after the speech about the formal incorporation of 
Lithuania, stating: ‘The expression of the will (of the free Lithuanian people 
who wanted a federation with free people of the tsarist Russia – author’s 
note) was the establishment of Soviet Lithuania in December 1918 and then 
the Lithuanian-Belarusian Soviet Republic (...) but the forces of Lithuanian 
reactionism united with Mensheviks, traitors of socialism, and assisted in 
various imperialist interventions, extinguished the young Soviet Republic’182. 
That way the Communist leaders accentuated the ‘historic necessity’ and 
‘reclamation of historic order’. Over the next month accredited facilities to 
the government in Kaunas were ordered to cease activity before 25 August183. 
Soviet authorities also noted that Lithuanian visas would expire184. There was 
a certain exception for a German facility – some employees of the embassy in 
Kaunas could remain in the city in order to carry out consular duties in the 
process of resettlement of Germans185. Nikolai Pozdnyakov noted that it is 
necessary to make sure that the archives and property of Lithuanian facilities 
are seized by the USSR186. Final incorporation of Lithuania to the Soviet Union 
occurred on 26 August 1940 187.
One of the last regulations was the final demarcation of Lithuanian and 
Belarusian territories. It was decided that Soviet Lithuania would be granted 
new territories, including towns: Druskininkai (Druskienniki), Švenčionėliai 
(Nowe Święciany), Adutiškis (Hoduciszki), and parts of regions: Astravyets 
(Ostrowiec), Ashmyany (Oszmiana), Pastavy (Pastawy) and Svir (Świr)188. 
That way territories which could not be negotiated in the period between 
winter 1939 and spring 1940 were obtained, though the agreement was 
ultimately modified for the benefit of Belarusian Soviet Republic anyway. 
Nevertheless, the border disputes between Lithuania and Belarus (mostly 
involving Adutiškis) were finally regulated only in years 1994–1996189. 
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Diplomats remaining outside Lithuania at the time of the aforemen-
tioned activities were gradually joining in protest against the actions 
of the pro-Soviet government. The strongest was sent on 21 July by an 
envoy in Berlin, Kazys Škirpa. He accused the government of uncon-
stitutional activity, letting Soviet forces into the country and falsifying 
the elections. Regarding the Seimas voting of 21 July he stated that the 
peace agreement with the Soviet Russia of July 1920 on recognising com-
plete independence and sovereignty of Lithuania by the Bolsheviks was 
breached, and similarly the pact of non-aggression of 1926, its extensions 
of 1931 and 1934, and the Mutual Assistance Treaty of 10 October 1939190. 
Therefore, he intended to give a protest note to the German Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. An official of the Ministry, Ernst Woermann, noted that 
the protest of the Lithuanian ambassador is his personal initiative with 
which he does not intend to lead to deterioration of relations of Kaunas 
and Berlin but he does not want to remain idle in face of the events in 
his homeland. Škirpa wanted to publish the appeal in German media 
but Woermann dissuaded him from that intention. The ambassador also 
informed him that he sent a protest telegram to Kaunas. Similar action 
was conducted by ambassadors of Latvia and Estonia191. Two days later, 
a message came from Lithuania stating that Škirpa is no longer an am-
bassador and that his citizenship will be withdrawn192. The consequently 
former representative of Kaunas bid farewell to his country and position 
in a rather unusual way – first by refusing to hand over the embassy 
building to Soviet representatives and before he was taken away by the 
German police he flew a Lithuanian flag so high up that only firefight-
ers were able to remove it193. German authorities allowed Škirpa to stay 
in Germany with his family194. Later, one emigration centre was estab-
lished, with his and other former diplomats’ contribution – the Lithua-
nian National Committee195. The former ambassador in Berlin himself 
also formed his own party196. A protest similar to Škirpa’s was conduct-
190  Ambasador litewski do Ribbentropa, in: Białe plamy, p. 193.
191  Memorandum MSZ Niemiec, in: Białe plamy, p. 196.
192  1940 г. июля 23, 14 час. 45 мин., Каунас. – Телефонограмма по ВЧ В.Г. Деканозова 
в НКИД СССР о заявлении К. Шкирпы о намерении Правительства Литвы лишить его 
гражданства, in: СССР и Литва, p. 698.
193  The German Ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, to the German Foreign Ministry, in: 
The USSR–German Aggression, p. 308.
194  Memorandum MSZ Niemiec, in: Białe plamy, p. 194.
195  Resolution of the Lithuanian Diplomatic Conference in Rome, in: The USSR–German 
Aggression, p. 315.
196  The Charter of the Lithuanian Activist Front, in: The USSR–German Aggression, p. 316.
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ed by Povilas Zadeikis in embassy in Washington197. The diplomat con-
ducted his activity also after the war to bring attention to the matters of 
Lithuania, including on the UN forum198.
After the incorporation of Lithuania into the USSR, its army was 
disbanded and transformed into Red Army troops: 29th Territorial Rifle 
Corps, 179th and 184th Rifle Divisions. The strength of Red Army was 
reinforced by about 16 thousand Lithuanians – privates and officers199. 
Some of them suffered repressions later on200. The commander of the 
29th Corps was the Commander-in-Chief of the Lithuanian army – 
General V. Vitkauskas201. During the war with Germans, desertions and 
murders of Lithuanian commanders occurred, a part of the army was 
destroyed due to combat – as a result, only about 2000 remained in the 
aforementioned units after the Red Army abandoned Lithuania on 26 June 
1941. On 23 September they were disbanded and on 18 December a new 
unit was formed – 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division202.
Also worth noting are the actions of the Kremlin serving to take over 
Lithuanian state property located abroad in the moment of the started 
annexation process. On 12 July financial reserves were transferred to the 
Central Bank of the USSR203 but some money, e.g. in the United States, could 
not be recovered. Due to the incursion of Soviet troops and illegal actions 
of Moscow the government of the USA refused to transfer Lithuanian 
savings204, even after the protest of Paleckis’s government205. Americans 
explained that they cannot conduct illegal activity – and transferring 
money to the invader would have been illegal206. Great Britain, similarly 
197  Note of the Lithuanian Minister in Washington, Žadeikis, to the U.S. Secretary of State, 
Hull, in: The USSR–German Aggression, p. 305.
198  Note of the Lithuanian Minister in Washington, Žadeikis, to the President of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, Pearson, in: The USSR–German Aggression, p. 400.
199  Литовцы в Красной Армии, ‘Историческая правда’, 19 X 2015, http://www.
istpravda.ru/pictures/1245/ [accessed on: 22 V 2019].
200  J. Wojtkowiak, Polacy i Litwini, oficerowie Armii Czerwonej w latach 1922–1941. Słownik 
biograficzny, Warszawa 2015, p. 79.
201  Литовцы в Красной Армии
202  Ibidem.
203  A. Eidintas et al., op. cit., p. 216.
204  1940 г. июля 20, Москва. – Вербальная нота Совнаркома СССР, вручённая зам. 
наркома иностранных дел С. А. Лозовским поверенному в делах США в СССР У. Торстону 
и переданная по ВЧ Н. Г. Позднякову для сведения, in: СССР и Литвa, p. 689.
205  1940 г. июля 20, Москва. – Проект ноты МИД Литвы, который следовало вручить 
американскому посланнику, переданный по ВЧ из НКИД СССР, in: СССР и Литва, p. 691.
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to the USA, also refused to relinquish the funds207. Western countries 
never recognised the incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR 
though their matters stopped being critical rather early208. Third Reich 
in turn maintained a position that they do not have financial obligations 
towards the LSSR, activity of customs offices was ceased and goods were 
confiscated209. Apart from that, Germans recognised the incorporation of 
the Baltic republics as an internal matter of these countries and took no 
particular action210. Apart from their intentions to incorporate the region 
of Marijampolė into the Third Reich.
gerMan Part of LithUania
The last chapter in the process of incorporation of Lithuanian into the 
USSR was explanation of the question regarding south-eastern regions 
of the country, as the Third Reich was interested in incorporation of the 
area. They began discussion on that as early as in June 1940211,while the 
claims of their own country were officially brought up again by Minister 
Ribbentrop on 13 June. Vyacheslav Molotov, during his conversation 
with ambassador Schulenburg, supported his counterpart, recognised the 
right of the Third Reich to that land but asked for postponement of the 
claim due to the current political situation and the need of resettlement 
of Lithuanians inhabiting the area212. Finally, in August 1940, the Kremlin 
informed in a memorandum that the territory exchange is not possible, 
instead offering money compensation of 3,860,000 dollars in gold (which 
constituted half of the sum which the USA paid Russia for Alaska!) over 
two years, also in form of goods213. Discussions regarding the amount to 
be paid to Germany by the USSR spanned over the following 6 months, 
propositions amounted to even 13 million dollars214. An agreement was 
207  1940 г. июля 21, Лондон. – Из дневника И. М. Майского. Из выступления зам. 
министра иностранных дел Великобритании Р. Батлера, in: СССР и Литва, p. 693.
208  C. Gerrard, The USSR and the Baltic States at the End of World War II: the View from 
London, in: The Sovietization of the Baltic States, 1940–1956, ed. O. Mertelsmann, Tartu 2003, 
p. 43.
209  P. Łossowski, Kłajpeda kontra Memel. Problem Kłajpedy w latach 1918–1939–1945, 
Warszawa 2007, p. 208.
210  А.Г. Донгаров, Г.Н. Пескова, op. cit., p. 46.
211  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 146.
212  Беседа наркома иностранных дел СССР В. М. Молотова с послом Германии в СССР 
Ф. Шуленбургом, in: : ДВП 1940, кн. I, p. 434.
213  Ambasador Schulenburg do MSZ Niemiec, in: Białe plamy, p. 200.
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reached only on 10 January 1941 when it was settled that the resignation 
from the claim to a part of Lithuanian territory would cost the Soviet Union 
7.5 million dollars in gold (or 31.5 million Reichsmarks) in proportion of 
1/8 in non-ferrous metals (over three months), the rest in gold (within the 
following month). The agreement allowed the Border Treaty between 
these countries to be signed on the same day215. Paradoxically, the sums 
received by Germany allowed them to finance preparations for ‘Barbarossa’ 
operation against the USSR the very same year216.
concLUsion
With current knowledge and available sources we cannot completely 
confirm that the precise plan of seizing the Baltic republics, including 
Lithuania, existed before their annexation nor determine the factual causes 
leading to the initiation of the process. Therefore, the research question 
lacks a definite answer. The predominant opinion in literature focusing 
on that topic is that the situation on the western front of World War II 
and concerns over the western borders of the Soviet Union are linked as 
a catalyst of the invasion of the Baltic States by the USSR. It seems that 
imperial ambitions and border revision was a long-term goal but not as 
important as securing what was already acquired by the Soviet Union 
by 1940. The goal was achieved though blackmail, introduction of Soviet 
troops into Lithuania and other Baltic States so that it would be possible to 
stage a coup imitating democratic procedures and free elections by directly 
tampering with the composition and activity of the executive authorities.
The history of Lithuania in 1940 is an example of the failure of the neutrality 
politics in the face of war and intrigues of great powers. A certain paradox, 
as noticed by George Kennan, is that the first countries to be incorporated 
into the USSR were the ones which established normal diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union217. Annexation of Lithuania was handled in a way that 
made it appear as a legal and voluntary decision of the nation to join the 
USSR. Reconstruction of the executive authority was forced, new elections 
and campaign were conducted hastily. P. Kierończyk points out the fact 
that the Lithuanian society thought until the end that the incorporation of 
the country to the USSR would not happen, after each phase it was believed 
that it was the end of Soviet activity. Apart from that, the government was 
215  German–Soviet Secret Protocol, in: The USSR–German, p. 288.
216  S. Dębski, op. cit., p. 248.
217  A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 24.
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being staffed with people not affiliated with Communist activism, which 
also strengthened the propaganda message218. Also worth noting is the fact 
that the subject of joining the USSR appeared in the election campaign and 
press only after announcing the result of the elections – while the election 
campaign only mentioned transformation of Lithuania into a socialist 
country. Nevertheless, as elected in free voting – because it was carried out 
after the flight of Smetona and the national government – the People’s Seimas 
on behalf of the Lithuanian people ‘willingly’ asked to be incorporated into 
the USSR as another Soviet republic. Repetition of this scheme in Latvia 
and Estonia provides a full scale of the bloodless operation of the Soviet 
conquest of the Baltic countries.
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streszczenie
Problemem badawczym poruszonym w niniejszej pracy jest zagadnienie procesu 
przyłączenia Republiki Litewskiej do Związku Radzieckiego latem 1940 r. oraz kontekst 
polityczny tego wydarzenia. Współcześnie wokół historii polityki Kremla w latach 1939–
1941 istnieje dużo kontrowersji historycznych i politycznych, niemniej w ostatnim czasie 
w polskiej historiografii temat aneksji Litwy nie był poruszany, a zagadnienie relacji i za-
leżności dyplomatycznych między obydwoma państwami nie było dotąd wyczerpująco 
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opisane. Pytanie badawcze sformułowano następująco: dlaczego, mimo obowiązywania 
Układu o przyjaźni, współpracy i pomocy wzajemnej z października 1939 r., Moskwa 
zdecydowała się na zmianę status quo i bezpośrednią aneksję sąsiedniego państwa mimo 
znacznych alternatywnych szerokich możliwości kontroli polityki Litwy? Badanie prze-
prowadzono analizując opracowane dokumenty służb dyplomatycznych obydwu państw 
(wśród których szczególne miejsce zajmuje korespondencja dyplomatyczna), ówczesną 
prasę radziecką pod kątem stosowanego przekazu propagandowego, a także wykorzy-
stano źródła memuarystyczne. W wyniku przeprowadzonych badań nie zdefiniowano 
jednoznacznych przyczyn zapoczątkowania procesu aneksji Litwy przez ZSRR, natomiast 
ujawniono szereg czynników mogących mieć znaczący wpływ na takie posunięcie Krem-
la. Należą do nich zarówno sukcesy III Rzeszy w II wojnie światowej w tym czasie co, 
zdaniem Moskwy, mogłoby zagrozić pozycji ZSRR w krajach bałtyckich i osiągniętym 
zdobyczom, jak również dalekosiężne plany imperialne Kremla i dążenie do rewizji granic 
w regionie.
Słowa kluczowe: 1940, Litwa, Związek Sowiecki, III Rzesza, niepodległość, aneksja, 
Pakt Ribbentrop-Mołotow, traktat o wzajemnej pomocy, Antanas Smetona, Juozas Urbšys, 
Józef Stalin, Wiaczesław Mołotow
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